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Criminal Procedure-VIRGINA'S LIMITED USE OF A Two-TRAL SYSTEM-
Snider v. Cox
It has long been the general assumption in criminal cases in the United
States that the fair trial provided for by the Federal Constitution' con-
templates a unitary one wherein all of the issues are deliberated within a
single proceeding, with verdict, and punishment if any, in the form of a
single pronouncement.2 A recent Virginia case, however, has held that the
issues of guilt and punishment are severable and may be tried separately
where particular circumstances exist.
In Snider v. Cox,3 the Virginia Supreme Court focused its attention on the
often-debated problems regarding the continued utilization of the unitary
trial concept, and held that there was no injustice in retrying a defendant
on the ,issue of punishment alone where that was the only issue unfairly
deliberated at the first trial.4 In Snider the defendant had been found guilty
of statutory rape and sentenced to death. In the course of the trial prospec-
tive jurors had been excluded on the grounds of having conscientious
scruples against capital puinshment. Subsequent to Snider's conviction the
United States Supreme Court in Witherspoon v. Illinois5 declared this
practice to be unconstitutional.6 On Snider's writ of habeas corpus the trial
1 U.S. CoNsr. amend VI.
2 The constitutionality of the unitary trial in capital cases has been challenged. See
Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 (1970). The issue remains undecided, however,
because the court studiously avoided any conclusion on the constitutionality of the
unitary process and decided the case on entirely different grounds.
3 212 Va. 13, 181 S.E.2d 617 (1971).
4 Cf. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The petitioner contended he was
denied a federal right when the Maryland Court of Appeals restricted his retrial to
the question of punishment, but the majority of the Supreme Court found there had
been no violation of the fourteenth amendment in such practice.
5 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
6 The Court carefully limited its decision:
The issue before us is a narrow one. It does not involve the right of the
prosecution to challenge for cause those prospective jurors who state that their
reservations about capital punishment would prevent them from making an
impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt. Nor does it involve the state's
assertion of a right to exclude from the jury in a capital case those who say
that they could never vote to impose the death penalty or that they would refuse
even to consider its imposition in the case before them. For the State of
Illinois did not stop there, but authorized the prosecution to exclude as well all
who said that they were opposed to capital punishment and all who indicated
that they had conscientious scruples against inflicting it. Id. at 513-14.
In light of such language, the dissent of Justice Black to the effect that the majority
opinion is based upon a "semantic illusion" which will not significantly change the




court held that although the sentence was clearly invalid, there was no
reason to question the validity of the verdict,7 and therefore the defendant
should be retried on the issue of punishment alone.s Snider thereupon ap-
pealed, contending that his new trial should embrace all of the issues, in-
cluding the question of his guiltY The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed
the lower court's decision and denied Snider a trial de novo.
In contrast to its frequent employment in civil suits,10 the two-stage trial
in criminal procedure is a comparative rarity.1 However, the split-trial con-
' See generally, Jurow, New Data on the Effect of a "Death Qualified" Jury on the
Guilt Determination Process, 84 HARv. L. Rlxv. 567 (1971); McClelland, Conscientious
Scruples Against the Death Penalty in Pennsylvania, 30 PA. BA.Q. 252 (1958); Oberer,
Does Disqualification of Jurors for Scruples Against Capital Punis&ment Constitute
Denial of Fair Trial on Issue of Guilt?, 39 TEXAs L. REv. 545 (1961).
8 See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) where the Court stated:
ITihe jury was entrusted with two distinct responsibilities: first, to determine
whether the petitioner was innocent or guilty; and second, if guilty, to deter-
mine whether his sentence should be imprisonment or death. It has not been
shown that this jury was biased with respect to the petitioner's guilt. But it is
self-evident that, in its role as arbiter of the punishment to be imposed, this
jury fell woefully short of that impartiality to which the petitioner was entitled
under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 518.
9 Cf. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) in which Justice Douglas in a
spirited dissent stated:
Although the Court reverses as to penalty, it declines to reverse the verdict
of guilt rendered by the same jury. It does so on the ground that petitioner
has not demonstrated on this record that the jury which convicted him was
"less than neutral with respect to guilt," . . . because of the exclusion of all
those opposed in some degree to capital punishment.... But we do not require
a showing.of specific prejudice when .a defendant has been deprived of his
right to a jury representing a cross section of the community. ... I would not
require a specific showing of a likelihood of prejudice, for I feel that we must
proceed on the assumption that in many, if not most, cases of class exclusion on
the basis of beliefs or attitudes some prejudice does result and many times will
not be subject to precise measurement. Id. at 531.
20In such cases the first trial determines liability, the second damages. See Annot.,
85 AL.R.2d 9 (1962); Annot., 34 A.L.R.2d 988 (1954); Annot, 29 A.L.R.2d 1199
(1953). It has been stated as a majority rule in civil suits that the new trial can be
limited to particular severable questions. 58 Am. Jur. 2d New Trial § 24 (1971). Vir-
ginia has remanded civil cases for trial before a different jury on issues of damages
alone or other specific issues. For a discussion of considerations, see Rawle v.
McIlhenny, 163 Va. 735, 177 S.E. 214 (1934). See also Certified TV & Appliance Co. v.
Harrington, 201 Va. 109, 109 SE..2d 126 (1959); Isenhour v. McGranighan, 178 Va.
365, 17 S.E.2d 383 (1941); Walker v. Crosen, 168 Va. 410, 191 S.E. 753 (1937);
Johnson v. Kellam, 162 Va. 757, 175 S.E. 634 (1934); Baker v. Carrington, 138 Va.
22, 120 S.F. 856 (1924).
1 Some jurisdictions do, however, allow bifurcated trial procedure in criminal
cases where insanity is a defense. Under such statutes, the first trial is on guilt or
innocence, the second on the insanity issue. See ARiz. REv. STAT. § 13-1621.01 (1968);
CAL. PN. CODE § 1026 (West 1970); CoLo. Cum. Psoc. CODE § 39-8-3 (1963) , TX.
CODE Clum. PRoc. art. 46.02 (1965). Arizona has recently held its statute violative
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cept has been advocated in some jurisdictions having "habitual criminal"
statutes,'2 and five states' 3 have gone so far as to institute by statute a system
of separate trials, one to decide guilt or innocence, a second to fix punish-
ment. It has been urged in other jurisdictions that the two-trial procedure
is more equitable both to the defendant and the state,14 but the majority
view in regard to this aspect of criminal procedure still subscribes to the
unitary trial concept.15 Consequently most states hold that if a new trial
is granted in a criminal case it must be de novo. Some justify this con-
clusion by state statute;' 6 some refer to precedent;'? some merely state their
conclusion without attempting to justify it.18
of due process and unconstitutional. State v. Shaw, 106 Ariz. 103, 471 P.2d 715
(1970); 22 SYRAcUSE L. REv. 823 (1971). In Shaw the court found that the statute
was unconstitutional since all inquiry relevant to the mental state of the defendant
was excluded from the first trial and the requisite criminal intent necessary for proof
of guilt had to be presumed. California has avoided this pitfall by case law which
provides that evidence relevant to criminal intent is admissible at the first trial, so
long as it does not touch the question of legal insanity. People v. Wells, 33 Cal.2d
330, 202 P.2d 53 (1949). See generally Annot., 67 AL.R. 1447 (1930).
12 In such cases there would be one trial to decide the issue of guilt or innocence,
another to decide the status of the defendant as a "habitual criminal" or not. See
generally, 39 Am. Jur. 2d Habitual Criminals and Subsequent Offenders § 2 (1968);
Annor., 79 A.L.R.2d 826 (1961).
13See CAL. PEN. CODE § 190.1 (Supp. 1967); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 5 53-10 (Supp.
1965); N.Y. PEN. LAW §§ 125.30, 125.35 (1967); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 4701 (1963);
TX. CODE Clum. PRoc. art. 37.07 (1966). The Model Penal Code also contains a split
trial provision. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (Proposed Official Draft, May 4, 1962). See
also S.D. CODE § 13.2012 (Supp. 1960) (trial court may ask jury to retire to deliberate
on penalty after verdict of guilt is determined).
14Proponents claim the split-trial concept is more fair to the defendant because evi-
dence of an aggravating and prejudicial nature need not be introduced in the course of
the trial of guilt or innocence, and more fair to the state since it allows evidence of
this nature to be made known to the jury when they are deliberating on punishment
thereby allowing the best-informed decision. See United States v. Curry, 358 F.2d 904
(2d Cir. 1966); Frady v. United States, 348 F.2d 84, 91 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (McGowan, J.).
15 "An order granting a new trial, particularly where so prescribed by statute,
results in a rehearing of the case before a new jury with the parties in the same position
as though the case had been never before heard." 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1426 (1961).
16 See Jones v. People, 155 Colo. 148, 151, 393 P.2d 366, 369 (1964) (interprets state
statute to provide for unitary trial and further notes presence of two-trial statutes
(note 13 supra) as indicative that the general rule must be changed by statute); State
ex rel. Lopez v. Killigrew, 202 Ind. 397, 174 N.E. 808 (1931); State v. Young, 200
Kan. 20, 434 P.2d 820 (1967); State v. Burke, 28 Wis. 2d 170, 172, 136 N.W.2d
297, 300 (1965) (interpreting "new trial" in state statute "as encompassing redetermina-
tion of guilt irrespective of whether the original or subsequent determination was
made on plea of guilty").
17See Hobbs v. State, 231 Md. 533, 191 A.2d 238 (1963); State v. White, 262 N.C.
52, 136 S.E.2d 205 (1964); Stough v. State, 75 Okla. Crim. 62, 128 P.2d 1028 (1942);
Clapp. v. State, 74 Okla. Crim. 144, 124 P.2d 267 (1942); State v. Percy, 81 S.D. 519,
137 N.W.2d 888 (1965).
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RECENT DECISIONS
The Snider case is but one of several cases requiring reappraisal in the
aftermath of the Witherspoon decision.'9 Several of these cases have been
squarely on point with Snider,20 and likewise have been remanded merely
for renewed deliberation of the punishment issue. However, it would be
presumptuous to interpret these cases as an unqualified endorsement of the
dual trial system on the part of the several states involved. The Virginia
court carefully limited its holding by referring to Johnson v. Common-
• wealth,21 in which it had earlier concluded that if the split-trial system was
to be adopted in Virginia the legislature, not the courts, should institute
such procedural reform. The court found that the Johnson holding did not
conflict with Snider because no procedural reform was being implemented
in the Snider case, but rather only a sanction for a trial on the issue of
punishment alone where the original sentence had been declared unconsti-
tutional. The court found nothing prohibiting the practice of retrial on the
sole issue of punishment,22 and therefore concluded that it must be per-
missible.
The Snider case, although expressly limiting the use of the split trial to
particular circumstances, nonetheless provides the foundation upon which
continuing and expanding exceptions to the general rule of unitary trial
in criminal cases may be built. Before considering further exceptions, how-
ever, the Virginia court should look carefully at those jurisdictions which
have implemented the two-trial system in capital cases. In the states of New
York, California and Pennsylvania the system has created myriad problems,
most of which have been in the area of admissibility of evidence,2 3 the very
18 See, e.g., State v. Parker, 77 Ohio App. 473, 68 N.E.2d 223 (1945).
9See Massey v. Smith, 224 Ga. 721, 164 S.E.2d 786 (1968); Miller v. State, 224
Ga. 627, 163 S.E.2d 730 (1968); Rouse v. State, 222 So. 2d 145 (Miss. 1969); State v.
Spence, 274 N.C. 536, 164 SEE.2d 593 (1968).
20 Massey v. Smith, 224 Ga. 721, 164 SE.2d 786 (1968) and Miller v. State, 224 Ga.
627, 163 S.E.2d 730 (1968) were both rape convictions, and both were sent back
merely for redetermination of punishment; Rouse v. State, 222 So. 2d 145 (Miss.
1969), a murder case, likewise was remanded solely for new deliberation on sentencing.
21208 Va. 481, 158 S.E.2d 725 (1968).
22The court referred to VA. CoDa ANN. § 19.1-192, 19.1-291; 19.1-292 (Cum.
Supp. 1971) in its review of relevant statutory law.
23The question that has become the perpetual stumbling block is what evidence is
admissible at the penalty trial. New York's statute provides "any relevant evidence,
not legally privileged, shall be received regardless of its admissibility under the
exclusionary rules of evidence." N.Y. PEN. LAW § 125.35 (McKinney 1967). This
opens a veritable Pandora's box of hearsay, questionable allegations and even tn-
constitutionally obtained evidence. "Presumably, the legislators believed that the
rules which are designed to assure fair trial are irrelevant in the determination
of life or death." Redlich, Edmond Cahn: A Philosopher for Democratic Man, 40
N.Y.U. L. Rav. 259, 270 (1965). California's statute provides no limit on the ad-
missibility of evidence during the penalty trial, but the California Supreme Court
1972]
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area in which the system's advocates claim it to be most remedial.2 The
system in fact seems to create more new problems than it alleviates old
ones.25 Virginia would be ill-advised to adopt it.26
R.C.K.
has refused to go as far as New York and allows at the second trial only evidence
it deems competent and relevant to the particular inquiry. See, e.g., People v. Lopez,
60 Cal. 2d 223, 384 P.2d 16, 32 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1963); People v. H-amilton, 60 Cal. 2d
105, 383 P.2d 412, 32 Cal. Rptr. 4 (1963); People v. Love, 53 Cal. 2d 843, 350 P.2d
705, 3 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1960); People v. Purvis, 52 Cal. 2d 871, 346 P.2d 22 (1959).
Pennsylvania's statute requires testimony at the second trial be "relevant and ad-
missible upon the question of penalty to be imposed upon the defendant." PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18 § 4701 (1963). The question of relevance is singularly difficult in a
capital case, since it depends upon a coherent and intelligible theory of the social
interests deemed to be protected by the death penalty sanction, a problem in reference
to which much has been written and little proved.
24 See note 14 supra.
25 In addition to the evidentiary problem (see note 23 supra) further difficulties
are rampant in New York and California. For a general discussion of the problems
of two-trial procedure, see Comment, The California Penalty Trial, 52 CAL. L. Rv.
386 (1964); Note, The Two-Trial System in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 50 (1964).
26 For a good general discussion of the problems the system would create in Vir-
ginia, see Note, Jury Sentencing in Virginia, 53 VA. L. REv. 968, 997-1000 (1967).
